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Abstract
This paper aims to demonstrate that the strategic approach of network formation can ge-
nerate networks that share the main structural properties of most real social networks. We in-
troduce a spatialized variation of the Connections model (Jackson and Wolinski, 1996) in which
agents balance the beneﬁts of forming links resulting from imperfect knowledge ﬂows through
bonds against their costs which increase with geographic distance. We show that, for inter-
mediary levels of knowledge transferability, our time-inhomogeneous process selects networks
which exhibit high clustering, short average distances and, when the costs of link formation are
normally distributed across agents, skewed degree distributions.
JEL classiﬁcation : D85; C63; Z13
Keywords : Strategic network formation; Time-inhomogeneous process; Knowledge ﬂows;
Small worlds; Monte Carlo simulations
Corresponding author. Nicolas Carayol, BETA (UMR CNRS 7522), Université Louis Pasteur, 61
avenue de la Forêt Noire, F-67085 Strasbourg Cedex; tel : +33-388352204; fax : +33-390242071; email :
carayol@cournot.u-strasbg.fr.
11. Introduction
There is an increasing consensus in the economic literature to recognize that network struc-
tures signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the outcomes of many social and economic activities. Such networks
are often strategically shaped by the participating agents, as recently highlighted by the theo-
retical economic literature (Jackson and Wolinski, 1996; Bala and Goyal, 2000). Models of such
kind encompass various contexts such as job-contact networks (Calvó-Armengol, 2004), oligo-
polies and R&D collaborations (Goyal and Moraga, 2001; Goyal and Joshi, 2003), buyer-seller
networks (Kranton and Minehart, 2000), etc. Nevertheless, this literature has not yet dedicated
much attention to the full characterization of the endogenous networks and most importantly to
the strategic conditions that may lead to the emergence of more complex networks that might
resemble real networks.
At the same time, the structural properties of real networks have been extensively explo-
red and characterized by some recent contributions in the ﬁeld of Statistical Physics. In short,
this (still highly active) literature has shown that in most social networks, the average distance
between any two nodes (computed as the minimal number of inter-individual connections) is
remarkably short1 while the agents remain highly clustered. Networks that simultaneously share
those two structural properties are said to be small worlds à la Watts and Strogatz (1998)2. Mo-
reover, most real networks also exhibit a skewed (right-asymmetric) distribution of connections
among agents (Albert and Barabási, 1999) which means that few agents have many links while
most agents are weakly connected3.
In this paper, we demonstrate that the strategic approach to network formation can lead to
the emergence of networks that share such structural properties4. For that purpose, we introduce
a strategic model of network formation built on a simple variation of the Connections model
of Jackson and Wolinski (1996). Myopic self-interested agents form costly links to beneﬁt from
agents with whom they are directly or indirectly connected in a network. The longer the dis-
tance in the relational network the weaker the positive externality. Moreover, the costs of direct
connections increase linearly with the geographic distance separating agents (in a close manner
as Johnson and Gilles, 2000). The model typically applies to knowledge ﬂows in interpersonal
connections between inventors for instance. Indeed, it has been repeatedly argued that invention
activity is far from being the outcome of isolated agents eﬀorts but of interactive and collective
processes (e.g. Allen, 1983; von Hippel, 1989) in which networks of interpersonal relations play
a key role by improving and facilitating information and knowledge transfers5.
1This idea can be traced back to the “six degree of separation” experiment of Milgram (1967).
2Such properties have for instance been evidenced for web sites links or coauthorship of scientiﬁc papers (see
Barabási and Albert, 1999; Newman, 2001).
3Survey papers on this literature are Strogatz (2001) and Albert and Barabási (2002).
4This aim is shared by Carayol and Roux (2004), Jackson and Rogers (2005) and Galeotti et al. (2006).
5Several previous theoretical works focus on how some ﬁxed network structures aﬀect information, knowledge
or technology diﬀusion (for example, David and Foray, 1994; Valente, 1996; Cowan and Jonard, 2003; Young,
2002).
2We study, in a dynamic time-inhomogeneous process of networks formation, how the degree
of knowledge transferability in networks, which may be related to its relative degree of tacitness
vs. codiﬁcation, generates qualitatively diﬀerent network architectures. In particular, the model
provides a theoretical ground for the relative density of invention networks depending on the
nature of knowledge : emergent networks are less dense when knowledge is either mostly tacit
or mostly codiﬁed. The model also provides an economic rationale for why connections between
inventors are mainly established in the local space and thus why knowledge mostly diﬀuses
locally (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Breschi and Lissoni, 2006). Our most striking result is that,
for a large region of intermediary levels of knowledge transferability, the stochastic process leads
to emergent networks that share the small world properties : they are highly clustered and
exhibit a low average distance thanks to some distant connections (Granovetter, 1973). The
latter are strategically formed while such shortcuts are usually thought as randomly attributed.
Lastly, when we introduce a normal (Gaussian) heterogeneity among agents on the costs they
bear for their direct connections, then emergent networks also exhibit skewed distributions of
neighborhoods, that is some few agents tend to play more central roles in the population.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents basic formal deﬁnitions. Section 3 is
devoted to the static features of the model and to the presentation of some analytical results on
pairwise stability and eﬃciency. In Section 4 we introduce the dynamic stochastic process and
the methodology we use. The results obtained for the dynamics are presented in Section 5. The
last section concludes.
2. Basics on graphs and network formation
We begin with some basic notions on graphs and next turn to formal deﬁnitions on networks
stability and eﬃciency.
2.1. Graphs
Consider a ﬁnite set of n agents, N = {1,2,...,n} with n ≥ 3, and let i and j be two
members of this set. Agents are represented by the nodes of a non-directed graph the edges of
which represent the links between them. The graph constitutes the relational network between
the agents. A link between two distinct agents i and j ∈ N is denoted ij. A graph g is a list
of non ordered pairs of connected and distinct agents. Formally, {ij} ∈ g means that ij exists
in g. We deﬁne the complete graph gN = {ij | i,j ∈ N} as the set of all subsets of N of size 2,
where each player is connected with all others. Let g ⊆ gN be an arbitrary collection of links on
N. We deﬁne G =
￿
g ⊆ gN￿
as the ﬁnite set of all possible graphs between the n agents.
Let g′ = g + ij = g ∪ {ij} and g′′ = g − ij = g\{ij} be respectively the graph obtained by
adding ij and the one obtained by deleting ij from the existing graph g. The graphs g and g′ are
said to be adjacent as well as the graphs g and g′′. For any g, we deﬁne N(g) = {i | ∃j : ij ∈ g},
the set of agents who have at least one link in the network g. We also deﬁne Ni(g) as the set
3of i’s neighbors, that is : Ni(g) = {j | ij ∈ g}. The cardinal of that set ηi(g) = #Ni(g) is called
the degree of node i. The total number of links in the graph g is η(g) = #g.
A path in a non empty graph g ∈ G connecting i to j, is a sequence of edges between distinct
agents such that {i1i2,i2i3,...,ik−1ik} ⊂ g where i1 = i, ik = j. A cycle is a path such that
i1 = ik. A network is acyclic if it does not contain any cycles. The length of a path is the
number of edges it contains. Let i ←→g j be the set of paths connecting i and j on graph g.
The set of shortest paths between i and j on g noted i￿ ←→gj is such that ∀k ∈ i￿ ←→gj, then
k ∈ i ←→g j and #k = minh∈i←→gj #h. We deﬁne the geodesic distance between two agents
i and j as the number of links of a shortest path between them : d(i,j) = dg(i,j) = #k, with
k ∈ i￿ ←→gj. When there is no path between i and j then their geodesic distance is conventionally
inﬁnite : d(i,j) = ∞.
If agents have ﬁxed positions in a given space, representing for example their geographic loca-
tion, one can deﬁne a new distance operator denoted l(i,j). In our model, we consider that agents
are equidistantly located on a circle (or a ring) with unitary intervals. Without loss of generality,
agents are ordered according to their index, such that i is the immediate geographic neighbor of
agent i + 1 and agent i − 1 but agent 1 and agent n who are neighbors. As a consequence, the
geographic distance between any two agents is given by l(i,j) = min{|i − j| ;n − |i − j|}.
Several typical graphs can be described. First of all, the empty graph, denoted g∅, is such
that it does not contain any links. The ring g◦ is a network in which all agents are connected
and only connected with their two closest geographic neighbors. The chain gc, is deﬁned as a
connected subset of the ring, that is gc ⊂ g◦ and ∀i,j ∈ N(gc),i ←→gc j  = ∅. If #gc = #g◦
then gc = g◦. Let gmc be a maximally connected chain such that #gmc = #g◦ − 1. If gc is such
that #gc   #gmc, there is always one and only one path between two connected agents i and
j (the set i ←→gc j is a singleton). The covering chain of the graph g is a chain gcc such that
for all i,j ∈ N : i￿ ←→g◦j ⊂ gcc iﬀ ij ∈ g. The double ring denoted g2◦ is a network such that
all agents are only connected with their four closest geographic neighbors. In the triple ring,
denoted g3◦, all agents are only connected with their six closest neighbors. Finally, a (complete)
star, denoted g⋆, is such that #g⋆ = n− 1 and there exists an agent i ∈ N such that if jk ∈ g⋆,
then either j = i or k = i. Agent i is called the center of the star. It should be noted that there
are n possible stars, since each node can be the center.
2.2. Networks stability and eﬃciency
We consider a network formation game in which pairs of agents meet and decide to form,
maintain or break links. The formation of a link requires the consent of both agents but not its
deletion which can emanate from one of them unilaterally. Moreover, agents are myopic : they
take their decisions on the basis of the immediate impacts on their current payoﬀs. Formally,
let πi :
￿
g | g ⊆ gN￿
→ R, the payoﬀs received by i from his position in the network g, with
πi(∅) = 0.
Jackson and Wolinski (1996) introduce the notion of pairwise stability which departs from the
Nash equilibrium since the process of network formation is both cooperative and non cooperative.
4A network is said to be pairwise stable if no incentive exists for any two agents to form a new link
or for any agent to break one of his existing links. The formal deﬁnition of the pairwise stability
notion follows. A network g ⊆ gN is pairwise stable if : i) for all ij ∈ g, πi(g) ≥ πi(g − ij) and
πj(g) ≥ πj(g − ij), and ii) for all ij / ∈ g, if πi(g + ij) > πi(g) then πj(g + ij) < πj(g).
As regard network eﬃciency, we use the ‘strong’ notion introduced by Jackson and Wolinski
(1996). It relies on the computation of the total value of a graph g given by : π(g) =
￿
i∈N πi (g).
A network g is then said to be eﬃcient if it maximizes this sum on the set of all possible graphs
￿
g | g ⊆ gN￿
, that is : π(g) ≥ π(g′) for all g′ ⊆ gN. It should also be noticed that several networks
can lead to the same maximal total value. For example, if we consider strictly homogeneous
agents, any isomorphic graph of an eﬃcient network is also eﬃcient.
3. The spatialized connections model
In this section, we present our model which is a simple variation of the Connections model
introduced by Jackson and Wolinski (1996) and present some new analytical results we obtain
on the structure of pairwise stable and eﬃcient networks.
3.1. The model
In this model, agents beneﬁt from knowledge that ﬂows through bilateral relationships. Ne-
vertheless, the communication is not perfect : the positive externality deteriorates with relational
distance. Formally, there is a decay parameter which represents the quality of knowledge transfer
through each bilateral connection. In a given network, agents can not strategically control the
circulation of knowledge. Moreover, agents bear costs for maintaining direct connections. Re-
lying on Debreu’s (1969) hypothesis according to which closely located players incur lower costs
to establish communications, we let links costs linearly increase with the geographic distance
between agents on the circle6.








where d(i,j) is the geodesic distance between i and j and cij the costs borne by i for a direct
connection with j. δ ∈ ]0;1[ is the decay parameter which gives the share of knowledge eﬀectively
transmitted through each edge. It may be associated with the characteristics of knowledge :
communication quality is likely to decrease with the degree of tacitness of knowledge while
it would increase with the codiﬁcation of knowledge. Thus, δd(i,j) gives the payoﬀs resulting
from the (direct or indirect) connection between i and j. It is a decreasing function of the
geodesic distance since δ is less than the unity. Notice that if there is no path between i and
j, d(i,j) = ∞ and then δd(i,j) = 0. Thus, the ﬁrst part of the right side of (1) expresses the
6Johnson and Gilles (2000) ﬁrst introduced such costs but consider a linear world.
5gross payoﬀs obtained by i thanks to the knowledge ﬂows he receives through all his direct and
indirect connections (assuming no time lag for simplicity). The second part describes the costs
of direct links. We assume that the cost of a direct connection between i and j is proportional
to the geographic distance separating them cij ∝ l(i,j), with l(i,j) computed on the external
metrics (the circle) considered. As a normalization device and in order to account for an inverse
relation between the costs and the size of the population, we assume that the costliest connection
costs unity : maxi,j∈N cij ≡ 1, which is also the upper bound of a positive externality. In the
ring metric we have maxi,j∈N l(i,j) = ⌈n/2⌉, the smallest integer higher than or equal to n/2.
Thus, it comes :
cij = l(i,j)/⌈n/2⌉. (2)
3.2. Some analytical results
The analytical results obtained on networks eﬃciency and stability in the model described
above are summed up in the following two propositions.
Proposition 1. Eﬃciency.
i) The empty network g∅ is the only eﬃcient network when δ +
(n−2)
4 δ2 < ⌈n/2⌉
−1 .
ii) If δ2 − δn−1 < ⌈n/2⌉
−1 , the value of any acyclic graph g is less than its associated
covering chain gc.
iii) Consider three chains gc,gc′ and gc′′, if gc′ ∩ gc′′ = ∅ and #gc = #gc′ + #gc′′, then
π(gc) > π(gc′)+π(gc′′). Moreover a maximal chain gmc (a chain such that #gmc = n−1) is the
most eﬃcient positive value chain.
Proofs. See Appendix.
Proposition 2. Stability.
i) When δ > ⌈n/2⌉
−1, the empty graph is never pairwise stable. When δ < ⌈n/2⌉
−1,
the empty graph g∅ is the unique acyclic pairwise stable graph and no network containing a
peripheral agent (has only one connection) is pairwise stable. The empty graph is pairwise stable
when δ = ⌈n/2⌉
−1 .
ii) The star g⋆ and the complete network gN are never pairwise stable.
Proofs. See Appendix.
4. The dynamic process of networks formation
This section is a self-contained presentation of our dynamic model. We ﬁrst introduce the
standard perturbed stochastic process of network formation and next focus on the terms by
which our process diﬀerentiates.
4.1. The standard perturbed stochastic process of network formation
Let gt ∈ G denote the state of the social network at period t (with t = 1,2,...). At each time
period, two agents i and j ∈ N are randomly selected. If they are directly connected, they can
6jointly decide to maintain their relation or unilaterally decide to sever the link between them. If
they are not connected, they can jointly decide to form a link or renounce unilaterally. Formally,
those two situations are the following :
i) if ij ∈ gt, the link is maintained if πi(gt) ≥ πi(gt − ij) and πj(gt) ≥ πj(gt − ij).
Otherwise, the link is deleted.
ii) if ij / ∈ gt, a new link is created if πi(gt +ij) ≥ πi(gt) and πj(gt +ij) ≥ πj(gt),with a
strict inequality for one of them.
The evolution of the system at any time t only depends on the present state of the system
given by the graph structure gt. The stochastic process is thus Markovian. The evolution of
the system {gt,t > 0} can be described by the probability matrix (P) describing the one-step
transition probabilities between all possible states of the ﬁnite state space G.
Jackson and Watts (2002) introduce small random perturbations ε > 0 which invert agents’
right decisions in creating, maintaining or deleting links. These perturbations may be unders-
tood as mistakes or as mutations. For small but non null values of ε, it can be shown that the
discrete-time Markov chain associated to the transformed transition matrix P(ε) is irreductible
and aperiodic and has thus a unique corresponding stationary distribution  (ε) which is the so-
lution of  (ε)×P(ε) =  (ε). Such perturbed stochastic process is ergodic. Intuitively ergodicity
occurs when it is possible to transit directly or indirectly between any chosen pair of states in a
potentially very long period of time. It allows the long run equilibrium ( (ε)) of the system to
be unique and independent of the initial conditions.
Usually, the modeler computes  ∗ = limε→0  (ε) and a state g (a network here) is said to be a
stochastically stable state (Young, 1993) if it has a non null probability of occurrence in the limit







In the network formation context, Jackson and Watts (2002) show that stochastically stable
networks are either pairwise stable or part of a closed cycle (of the unperturbed process).
4.2. A time-inhomogeneous process of network formation
In practice the precise computation of the stochastically stable networks requires the iden-
tiﬁcation of all the recurrent classes of the unperturbed process (Young, 1998) which, in the
network context, are likely to be extremely numerous. To make that point clear, we shall recall
that there is a recurrent class for each pairwise stable network and that in models such as the
Connections model or the spatialized connections model presented in Section 3, possibly thou-
sands of networks are pairwise stable. Thus, the standard process described above is not well
designed for our purpose.
We propose to let the error term decrease in time according to the following simple rule :
εt = 1/(t + 1) + ε , (3)
with ε > 0. This rule ensures that a signiﬁcant noise aﬀects the dynamics in the beginning while
it decreases monotonically with time down to a small strictly positive limit : limt→∞ εt = ε.
7According to Robles (1998), the long run equilibrium ψ(ε) of such time-inhomogeneous Markov
chain exists, is unique and is equal to the equilibrium of the Markov chain perturbed by the
constant error ε : ψ(ε) =  (ε) 7. It is then obviously ergodic. This property is interesting since
it renders numerical experiments more tractable in order to examine with good conﬁdence the
long run behavior of the system (Vega-Redondo, 2006). Notice that the time-inhomogeneity of
noise assumption is more satisfactory than the time-homogeneity of noise one. Agents are likely
to make less and less errors through time while still a very small error probability persists in
the long run.
We label the networks on which the process stabilizes in the long run as emergent networks.
Formally the set of emergent networks is ￿ G =
￿
g ∈ G
￿ ￿ψg(ε) > 0
￿
. This set is broader than the
set of stochastically stable networks deﬁned above which is included in ￿ G. That is, for all g such
that, if limε→0  g(ε) > 0 then ψg(ε) > 08.
5. Results : The structural properties of emergent networks
In this section we study the emergent networks selected by the stochastic process described
in the preceding section. We use Monte Carlo experiments to generate networks that are on
the support of the unique limiting stationary distribution ψ(ε) (of networks) of the perturbed
dynamic process presented above. The limit error term is ε = 10−4. The size of the network is
arbitrarily set to n = 20 agents. All experiments are stopped at T = 20,000, period after which
the process is proven to have almost surely stabilized on a given pairwise stable state9. We shall
focus on the characterization of the structural properties of emergent networks depending on
the knowledge transfer parameter δ. For this purpose we ran 1,500 experiments performed with
randomly drawn values of δ over its value space ]0,1[.
5.1 How density is aﬀected by knowledge transferability?
In order to provide a ﬁrst synthetic characterization of the structural properties of networks,
we compute the average neighborhood size or average degree as it is usually referred to in the
literature of the network as follows :
ˆ η(g) = η(g)/n. (4)
7See Proposition 3.1 of Robles (1998, p. 211).
8This can be easily proved by recalling the Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) theorem that states : ∀g, ψg(ε) =  g(ε)
is of the form : ψg(ε) = υg(ε)/
￿
g′ υg′(ε) with υg(ε) a polynomial in ε.
9In average, non pairwise stable networks are rarely found after 20,000 periods (less than 4%). Let us precise
that emergent networks are not necessarily pairwise stable. They can also be part of a closed cycle in the associated
time-homogeneous unperturbed process (εt = 0). We also can not exclude that some non pairwise stable networks
are just emergent networks since ε > 0. Nevertheless, in practice, when such a non pairwise stable network was
found, it is because an error recently aﬀected the system. Thus, we dropped these experiments to ensure that
the results are not contingent to recent arbitrary changes. Thus, our approximations of the emergent networks
distributions restrict to the emergent networks that are pairwise stable.
8Let ﬁrst examine how the average degree ˆ η(g) is aﬀected by δ. As shown in Figure 1, the average
degree is null when δ   ⌈n/2⌉
−1 = 0.1 : the process converges to the empty graph which is
pairwise stable for such values of the parameters (see Proposition 2). However when δ becomes
close to 0.1, some non empty networks begin to be selected. These networks are somehow in a
phase transition between the empty graph and networks for which agents have in average two
connections (average degree equal to unity). This conﬁguration appears to be mostly selected
for 0.1   δ   0.2. The average degree of the network then increases up to nearly ˆ η(g) = 3 for
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Figure 1. Average degree ˆ η(g) of emergent networks for 1,500 simulations with randomly
drawn values of δ ∈ ]0;1[.
Let us remind that the transferability of knowledge δ can be associated with the characteris-
tics of knowledge : the quality of communication is likely to decrease with the degree of tacitness
of knowledge while it would increase with the codiﬁcation of knowledge. Our model thus pro-
vides an explanation of how the nature of knowledge aﬀects the density of emergent networks.
We ﬁnd that both when knowledge is mainly tacit (δ close to 0) or mainly codiﬁed (δ close
to 1), the emergent networks are weakly connected. In both cases, the marginal returns from
direct distant and/or local overlapping connections do not overbalance their associated costs.
Thus, only local minimally connected networks emerge (when knowledge is extremely tacit, no
connection is formed). It is when the knowledge has balanced codiﬁed and tacit parts that such
private returns are suﬃciently high for the network average degree to increase.
5.2 When do small worlds emerge?
Behind the dots of Figure 1, one can ﬁnd networks with many diﬀerent structures. This
diversity calls for a statistical analysis of the structural properties of emergent networks. For
that purpose, we compute two dedicated indexes. The former is the average distance (or average





j =i d(i,j) × 1{i ↔g j  = ∅}
#{i,j |i  = j ∈ N,i ↔g j  = ∅}
, (5)
9if η(g) > 0, with #{ } denoting the cardinal of the set deﬁned into brackets and 1{ }, the indi-
cator function that is equal to unity if the condition into brackets is veriﬁed and zero otherwise.
This index allows us to appreciate the extent to which directly or indirectly connected agents
are “relationally” distant.
The second index is the average clustering (or average cliquishness as it is often referred to







#{jl ∈ g|j  = l ∈ Ni(g)}
#{j,l|l  = j ∈ Ni(g)}
. (6)
In words this index measures the propensity with which an agent’s neighbors are also neighbors
together.
The two indicators presented above are aﬀected by the average degree of the network (ˆ η(g))
that is likely to vary with δ. Therefore, these indicators are somehow biased and we must ﬁnd
an eﬃcient control for average degree. In the spirit of Watts and Strogatz (1998), we associate
control random graphs to emergent networks characterized by the same number of agents and
links (thus the same average degree). Such random networks are simply built by allocating a
given number of edges to randomly chosen pairs of agents (Erdös and Rény, 1960). For each
given number of edges of emergent networks, the average distance and the average clustering
are numerically computed and averaged over 1,000 of such random graphs. Thus, instead of







denotes the mean average clustering of the 1,000 random networks that have exactly the
same average degree as g. Similarly we compute d(g)/d
￿
grd￿






0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
delta
Figure 2. Average distance (black circles : d(g)/d
￿
grd￿




) and their ﬁtted values of emergent networks for 1,500 simulations with randomly
drawn values of δ ∈ ]0;1[.
10Such ratios have been used by Watts and Strogatz (1998) to identify a speciﬁc but fre-











Small world networks are highly clustered as compared to random graphs and simultaneously
their average distance is close to the one of random graphs which are known to exhibit very
short average path length. We observe that the average distance of emergent networks becomes
close to unity when δ reaches 0.35, and then stays on this value until δ ≈ 0.9. The average
clustering ratio also decreases quite sharply with δ > 0.2. Nevertheless, the clustering of emergent
networks remains signiﬁcantly higher than their corresponding random networks, at least until
δ   0.7. Therefore, we conclude that small world conﬁgurations are selected for the whole region
characterized by δ ∈ [0.35,0.7].
5.3 The spatial structure of emergent networks
Before exploring statistically the extent to which networks correlate and/or discorrelate with
the ring-like geography, we provide in Figure 3 some intuitions on the typical networks shapes
obtained for several values of the parameter δ. When 0.09 ￿ δ   0.2, it is the ring g◦ which
emerges most often (characterized by an average degree equal to one in Figure 1 and a null
average clustering in Figure 2). So agents not only have two neighbors in average, but all are
connected to their two closest geographic neighbors. When δ is equal to 0.3, networks in which
all agents are connected to their four closest geographic neighbors are likely to emerge. Such
situation corresponds to the double geographic ring g2◦. At the other far end of the spectrum,
emergent networks tend to become maximal chains (gmc) : when δ approaches unity, direct and
indirect connections are likely to provide the same wealth, and thus overlapping connections
become redundant. Between these two extremes, when 0.35   δ   0.7, we ﬁnd structurally
distinguishable conﬁgurations characterized by the conjunction of : i) a prevalence of local
connections, ii) the existence of some “short cuts”. The speciﬁcity appears clearly when one
























































































































Figure 3. Typical emergent networks obtained with δ = 0.15, δ = 0.3, δ = 0.35,δ = 0.7,
δ = 0.98. The last network has been generated with the standard connections model of Jackson
and Wolinski (1996) with δ = 0.7 and a connection cost equal to 0.510.
10The link cost in the standard connections model is set to 0.5 because this value is close to the average link
cost borne by an agent to connect to any other agent in our spatialized connections model.
11In order to provide a systematic analysis of the correlation of social connections with the
ring-like geography, we propose to study p( ), the density distribution of direct connections






1{l(i,j) = h}, (8)
for all h = 1,...,⌊n/2⌋, with ⌊ ⌋ meaning “the highest integer smaller than”.
In order to explore such a distribution when the emergent networks have the small world
properties, we perform 100 additional numerical experiments for each of the following values of
δ : δ = 0.35,0.5,0.7. Averaged distributions for each value of δ are presented in Figure 4. Unsur-
prisingly, networks do correlate with the geographic metrics. Indeed, between 70% and 80% of
links connect two agents at a geographical distance equal or less than 2. Clustering is thus achie-
ved in local space. Nevertheless, the networks also exhibit these distant connections that make
p( ) be long tailed on the upper side of the spectrum. The originality of these networks clearly
relies on the fact that they both correlate with space and have some uncorrelated connections.
Lastly, when δ equals 0.5 or 0.7, then there is an increased probability that connections are made
at geographical distance 5 and 6. Agents ﬁnd it proﬁtable to establish such medium distance
connections as a benchmark between overcoming the local cluster of which they already beneﬁt
from and bearing not too high connection costs. This result supports the idea that sustainable
short cuts are not made at a random distance (and cost) like in Watts and Strogatz (1998) but















Figure 4. Distribution of links p( ), according to the geographic distance between the two
directly connected agents l(i,j) (averaged over 100 experiments for each value of
δ = 0.35,0.5,0.7).
Since distant connections are necessary to meet the small world properties and since these
distant connections are also very costly (remember that connection costs increase with geographic
distance), a natural issue raises : why do some agents bear such costs? In other words, does it
pay to sustain shortcuts? For this purpose, we record for each of the experiments computed for
δ ∈ {0.35,0.5,0.7}, the individual payoﬀs (πi) and li, deﬁned as the longest (geographic) distance
12between i and i’s neighbors : li ≡ maxj∈Ni(g) l(i,j). Two-way plotted results are presented in
Figure 5. It shows that individual payoﬀs decrease in average when agents sustain a connection
longer or equal to 4. Therefore we can conclude that it does not pay to sustain distant connections
in the long run11. Nevertheless, for any shortcut to exist, it must remain advantageous to sustain
it : payoﬀs must be increased with rather than without it. The agents who sustain a distant
connection are locked in, in the sense they are better oﬀ with this connection though they
can not appropriate the full social value it generates which is to a large extent captured by
their local neighbors. If the latter (sustaining no distant connection) have higher payoﬀs, it is
clearly because they indirectly beneﬁt from these connections while they do not bear their high
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Figure 5. Fractional polynomial estimates (with 90% conﬁdence interval) of individual payoﬀs
(πi in ordinates) respective to agent’s longest (geographically) connection (li in abscises)
(100 × 20 = 2,000 agents are considered for each of the three values of δ considered : 0.35
(left), 0.5 (middle), 0.7 (right).
5.4 The heterogeneity of agents and skewed degree distribution
Low average path length and high average clustering characterize small worlds à la Watt
and Strogatz (1998). Another general result of the physics literature on social networks is that
their degree distribution is usually skewed. This last result comes from the scale free networks
approach (Barabási and Albert, 1999). In short, this means many agents have few connections
while few agents have many connections. In the model presented in equation (1) agents have no
incentive to form many connections. Rather they have incentives to be connected to a “star”.
This is why we naturally do not ﬁnd some densely connected agents among emergent networks
as observed in most real networks. Therefore, we now explore whether slight modiﬁcations of
the payoﬀ function might increase the disparity in neighborhood sizes.
Let us consider that agents are heterogeneous in the costs they bear for link formation. The








11Due to space constraints, we did not report simple econometric estimations that conﬁrm the inverse-U relation
between li and payoﬀs when we control for network density that explains much of the variance observed in Figure
5.
13where ai > 0 and its mean  ai  = 1 to keep consistency with (1). This implies that the costs
bore by two agents to be linked together (aicij,ajcij) may now diﬀer. Moreover, we assume that
the ai are distributed in a Gaussian fashion, numerically given in Figure 6. The ai are randomly
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Figure 6. Distribution of ai among agents.






1{ηi(g) = k}, (10)
for all k = 0,...,n − 1.
As in the previous subsection, we perform, with the heterogeneous agents model (ai distri-
buted as presented in Figure 6), 100 additional numerical experiments for each of the following
values of δ : δ = 0.35,0.5,0.7. For each of these values, the averaged degree distributions are
computed and plotted in Figure 7 which also presents the averaged degree distributions for the
homogeneous agents model (ai = 1).
We ﬁnd that while most agents have 4, 5 or 6 connections in the homogeneous model12, de-
gree distribution is indeed much more dispersed when agents are heterogeneous. Unsurprisingly,
the agents who have lower costs are much more inclined to form numerous connections. What is
of much interest is that a Gaussian-like distribution of agents as regard costs generates an asym-
metric and long tailed degree distribution. Though we consider a limited number of agents, this
result is consistent with the skewed degree distributions often observed in most social networks.
Moreover, it should be noticed that unreported experiments (due to space constraints) perfor-
med with the heterogeneous agents model and random values of δ ∈ ]0;1[ show that the small
world properties are fully preserved for 0.35   δ   0.713. Therefore, all the three characteristics
(short average path length, high average clustering and skewed degree) are then simultaneously
observed on emergent networks.
12Bimodality on 4 and 6 neighbors is found when δ = 0.35.
13On the contrary, it tends to increase slightly the range of relevant values of delta for which a small world à la
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Figure 7. Degree distribution ρ(k) (averaged over 100 experiments for each value of
δ : 0.35,0.5,0.7, for the two models described in (1) and (9)).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a model of network formation in which agents, arranged on
a circle, myopically decide to establish, maintain or severe links. For that, they balance the
beneﬁts obtained from knowledge that imperfectly ﬂows through bilateral relationships (positive
externalities deteriorate with relational distance) against the costs they pay to maintain direct
connections which linearly increase with geographic distance. We also proposed an original time-
inhomogeneous stochastic process to study the structural properties of networks that emerge in
the long run.
We showed that a simple model of strategic network formation which is a spatialized va-
riation of the Connections model developed by Jackson and Wolinski (1996), can lead, in a
dynamic setting, to emergent networks that share the main structural properties of most real
social networks. We ﬁrst studied the eﬀects of the parameter which tunes the decay of positive
externalities in each bilateral connection, on the structure of emergent networks. We found that
density is the highest when the decay is around 55%-60%. It decreases down to the empty net-
work when decay is small and to minimally connected networks when decay is close to the unity.
For a large region of intermediary levels of the decay (35% to 70%), we found, while controlling
for networks density, emergent networks that exhibit the small world conﬁgurations characte-
rized by both a high average clustering and a short average path length. Clustering occurs in
local space while few agents sustain distant connections. We further studied, for this region, the
eﬀects of introducing agents’ heterogeneity as regard their connections costs (distributed in a
Gaussian manner). We found that emergent networks exhibit in addition asymmetric distribu-
tions of neighborhoods. Therefore, we conclude that the three characteristics of a short average
distance, a high average clustering and a skewed degree distribution are simultaneously gathered
for a large and intermediary region of the decay parameter.
15Let us now brieﬂy discuss some implications of our results as regard the interplay between
knowledge, networks and geography. Indeed, this model provides a theoretical ground for the
relative density of invention networks depending on the nature of knowledge, assuming that the
decay parameter measures the quality of interpersonal knowledge transfers. Emergent networks
are less dense both when knowledge is highly tacit or highly codiﬁed (knowledge transferability
is low or high). The model also provides an economic rationale for why connections between
inventors are mainly established in the local space and thus why knowledge mostly diﬀuses
locally. This result is fully consistent with the empirical studies of Saxenian (1994), Almeida
and Kogut (1999) or Breschi and Lissoni (2006) which show that local knowledge diﬀusion
(Jaﬀé et al., 1993) occurs thanks to the higher density of social networks within local areas.
Furthermore, if denser and more clustered networks are found in local areas, some long distant
connections are likely to be formed when the quality of knowledge transfer is intermediary. Then
the private returns of distant connections overcome their high costs and are thus established.
Such links are strategically formed with parsimony because, since knowledge ﬂows in local areas
thanks to local clustering, the neighbors of agents sustaining shortcuts have no incentive to
duplicate distant connections they already beneﬁt from.
This suggests agents free-ride on the distant connections of their neighbors. It can also be
shown that, for some high values of knowledge transferability, the social surplus in star networks
overbalance the ones of the emergent networks. Agents fail to coordinate in selecting one of them
to play the role of knowledge transmitter : no agent intends to bear the costs associated to such
a central position. An eﬃciency analysis of emergent networks is further needed in order to fully
appreciate the structural diﬀerences between the emergent networks and the eﬃcient ones. This
issue constitutes an avenue for further research.
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16Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
i) The proof uses the following steps. We give an upper bound expression for the connected
network value of k links. We show that this expression is at its maximum when k = n−1 links.
Next, we show that under the given condition, that expression is negative. Since the value of
the empty graph is zero, it is the eﬃcient network under the condition.
An upper bound value of a network of k > n − 1 links may be given by :
πmax(g|#g = k) = 2kδ + [1/2n(n − 1) − k]δ2 − 2k⌈n/2⌉
−1
This expression considers that all agents who are not directly connected, beneﬁt from each other
just as they were at relational distance 2. It also assumes that bonds costs are minimal (as it
is connecting immediate geographic neighbors). Now assume that k = n − 1. Thus the upper
bound network value becomes :
πmax(g|#g = n − 1) = 2(n − 1)
￿




To know whether we should consider cases where k > n−1, let us see how the upper expression
of the network value behaves when we add a link : The maximal value with k (k > n − 1) links
minus the max value with k + 1 links is equal to :
πmax(g|#g = k + 1) − πmax(g|#g = k) = 2δ − δ2 − 2⌈n/2⌉
−1
which is independent of k and strictly negative when δ < ⌈n/2⌉
−1. Thus there is no interest in
adding a new link from the beginning that is from k = n − 1.
On the other hand if k < n−1, the network is not connected, then no node can beneﬁt from
all others. For instance if k = n − 2, then the agents are associated to at least two connected
components. Since the two components are isolated, the total value of the graph is equal to the
sum of the value of the two components. Let us assume that it is possible to connect the two
components by adding a bond at distance 1 (as it is assumed in the πmax expression). Then the
value of this bond adds to the total value more than any of the other ones did previously while
it costs at most the same. Thus the value of the graph with n − 2 links is negative if the one of
the connected graph composed of n − 1 links is also negative.
Thus expression (A1) gives the maximal value of the network. It is negative when : δ +
(n−2)
4 δ2 < ⌈n/2⌉
−1 . This completes the proof.￿
Part ii) Any non empty acyclic graph is a tree or a set of disjoint trees (with potentially
some isolated agents). A tree of m nodes has always k = m−1 links. A tree of m+u−1 nodes
generates more utility than a graph composed of two distinct trees of m and u nodes, that is
because with the same number of links, it generates one more direct and several more indirect
connections. Thus we can restrict our analysis to connected acyclic graphs which are necessarily
trees.
17One can get two diﬀerent types of trees given the following deﬁnition. A network g is said
to exhibit regional overlap if ∃i ∈ N(g) such that for an arc jh ∈ g,i ∈ N(gcc), with gcc the
covering chain of g.
a) Let us ﬁrst consider the trees for which there is no regional overlap.
In that situation, any link ij in g generates a cost equal to its covering chain (Deﬁnition
3) while it generates less utility since less agents are thus directly or indirectly connected. This
applied for all bonds that exhibit no regional overlap. Thus the value of such network is always
below the one of its associated covering chain.
b) Consider now connected trees which exhibit some regional overlap. In that situation, each
link ij of g such that l(i,j) generates an extra cost of 2⌈n/2⌉
−1 as compared to its covering
chain, while it generates at most a gross extra value of 2δ2 − 2δn−1. Thus π(g) < π(gc) if
δ2 − δn−1 < ⌈n/2⌉
−1 .￿
Part iii) The proof of the ﬁrst part of the Proposition is trivial since gc costs as much as
gc′ and gc′′, while it brings more utility due to more indirect connections. As regard, each new
node added to the chain costs as much as the preceding ones while it always brings more value
due to more indirect connections. Thus, if the maximal chain gmc has a positive value, then it
is always the most eﬃcient chain.￿
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Part i) When δ > ⌈n/2⌉
−1, the proof is trivial : two geographic neighbors always have interest
in forming a connection. When δ < ⌈n/2⌉
−1, it is easy to show that the empty network is always
stable. Being on the empty net, no agent has any interest in forming a link even with his direct
-geographic- neighbors since this connection will cost him always more than the (direct) gross
payoﬀ it may bring to him. Moreover, as showed by Jackson and Wolinski (1996), in such a
situation, stability implies no loose end, that is no agent i is connected to only one other agent
j. That is because j will always ﬁnd interest in severing this connection. Thus, as noticed by
Johnson and Gilles (2000), since all acyclic networks but the empty graph always have loose ends
(among which the star net), the empty network is the only acyclic pairwise stable network.￿
Part ii) In the star network, the center of the star is never interested in maintaining a link
with his most distant neighbor. This link costs him 1, which is strictly more than his gross utility
which is simply δ < 1. In the complete network, no agent has an incentive to maintain his most
distant connection since its deletion would reduce costs of 1 while gross utility would decrease
of only δ − δ2 < 1. Then, neither the star nor the complete graphs are paiwise stable.￿
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